We study the problem of secure message multicasting over graphs in the presence of a passive (node) adversary who tries to eavesdrop in the network. We show that use of feedback, facilitated through the existence of cycles or undirected edges, enables higher rates than possible in directed acyclic graphs of the same mincut. We demonstrate this using code constructions for canonical combination networks (CCNs). We also provide general outer bounds as well as schemes for node adversaries over CCNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a source that would like to securely multicast a message to a set of receivers in the presence of passive adversaries. It is well known that over wireless networks, if public feedback is available, we can support higher secrecy rates than if it is not [1] . We explore in this paper whether the same could be true over wired networks that are modeled as graphs.
While security against eavesdropping has been extensively examined (in a number of interesting works) in the network coding literature, the potential utility of feedback as such has not, as far as we know. Seminal works such as [2] , [3] have looked both at information theoretical bounds as well as code constructions for the case of edge adversaries; works have also started examining the case of node adversaries [4] , [5] . In all cases however the underlying network is modeled as a directed acyclic graph.
Yet feedback is readily available in wired networks, and could potentially help in secrecy. Many times connections between sources and receivers are undirected or bi-directional; even over directed graphs, we may have cycles, that offer a form of feedback between network nodes. The existence of such cycles could be put to good use to create for instance common randomness between intermediate network nodes, that a secrecy protocol could leverage to achieve higher rates.
We here provide a number of examples to establish that this is indeed the case. We mainly consider node adversaries, that tap a specific network node and intercept all incoming messages, but also discuss edges adversaries. We focus on a special class of (minimal) combination networks, that is often used in the network coding literature, and the simplest possible case, of a single node adversary. We derive outer bounds as well as achievability schemes for the cases where feedback This work was supported in part by NSF award 1136174, MURI award AFOSR FA9550-09-064, ERC Project NOWIRE ERC-2009-StG-240317 and a Ramanujan Fellowship from the DST (India). is (and is not) available. We design schemes that employ feedback, which can offer rates higher than outer bounds in the case where feedback is not available. These results point to the potential of using such feedback for network secrecy; a topic of ongoing investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our notation and basic notions; Section III examines feedback over simple abstracted examples. Section IV deals with inner and outer bounds for directed acyclic graphs, mainly developed for comparison purposes in this paper. Finally, Section V shows the benefits of feedback in undirected and bidirected graphs.
II. NOTATION AND SETUP
We model a wired network as a graph G = (V, E) with unit capacity edges. A single source node has a message W to send to a set of receivers R ⊂ V. We are interested in deriving outer bounds, as well as building N -round secure protocols with the following constraints:
• Round : Each edge can be used at most once in a round.
• Decodability : All receivers perfectly decode message W with zero error probability.
• Secrecy : H(W|V A ) = H(W) where V A denotes the "view" of an adversary A, i.e, the information available to tapped edges or nodes during the protocol. We say that such a protocol achieves • Secrecy rate : H(W) N . We distinguish between two types of passive adversaries: • k-edge adversary : the adversary has access to an arbitrary set of k edges.
• k-node adversary : the adversary has access to an arbitrary set of k nodes. In this paper, we mainly focus on a 1-node adversary. We allow intermediate nodes to do operations over a finite field F. We also assume that the network nodes share no prior common randomness and no side secure communication channel, they can only communicate through the network graph that is subject to eavesdropping.
Canonical combination networks (CCNs): Our results in this paper are over CCNs, that essentially are minimal 1 combination networks, see [6] , [4] . Figure 1 shows a directed (m, h)-CCN with m ≥ h, where m is the number of coding points and h the mincut to the receivers. It has a source S, h trivial coding nodes A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A h (with indegree one), 
III. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLES
We consider the simple networks depicted in Figure 2 , where a single source S wants to securely send information to a receiver R; we think of the edges in these networks as abstracting edge-disjoint (and in the last case node-disjoint) paths in larger networks. Our goal is to build basic intuition on when feedback could be useful. For the first three examples we assume a k-edge adversary, while for the last a 1-node adversary.
Example in Figure 2 (a): the outer bound on the secrecy rate is h − k and is achievable. This follows trivially from [2] . Figure 2 (b): for this undirected graph the outer bound remains h−k (proved below), and its achievability follows from [2] . We can show the outer bound as follows. We apply the "crypto-inequality" in [7] which states that
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where W is the source message, K S is the private randomness of the source, K R is the private randomness of the receiver and U N denotes the values exchanged between the source and receiver during any N -round protocol. Simply put, (1) implies that (W, K S ) and K R , which were independent to begin with, remain independent even after conditioning on all values exchanged during the protocol. For the graph in this example,
where U N 1:h denotes 2 values exchanged between the source and receiver during the N -round protocol, (a) follows from the decodability constraint, (b) follows from (1) and (c) follows from the secrecy constraint.
Example in Figure 2 (c): for this cyclic graph, if we have h forward (from S to R) edges and q backward edges (from R to S), the outer bound becomes min{h, h + q − k} where the bound h + q − k follows easily with similar steps as in (2) . The outer bound is achievable as follows. To achieve it, when k ≤ q, we can send q random packets (keys) from R to S using the backward edges, say r 1 , . . . , r q . The source creates h linear combinations (using for instance an MDS code) of these r-packets, say s 1 , . . . , s h , so that the r-packets and the s-packets are in general position (any selection of q of these packets are linearly independent). The source uses the s-packets as one-time pads for the forward edges. With this construction, an adversary observing any k edges will not be able to retrieve information (for further details and proof of secrecy, see extended version of this paper [11] ), and we can thus achieve secrecy rate h. We can easily extend this scheme in the case where k > q, by combining the previous scheme with the scheme in [2] : use again the backward edges to convey random packets to the source, have the source itself generate k − q random packets, and combine these to create one-time pads to encode h − (k − q) information messages to send to the receiver using secure network coding (for more details see [2] ).
Example in Figure 2(d) : for this bidirectional graph with two intermediate nodes C 1 and C 2 , we can achieve secrecy rate 2 even if there is a 1-node passive adversary. To do so, the receiver R can send keys k 1 and k 2 to the source S. Since C 1 and C 2 each observe only one of the keys, S can use k 1 + k 2 as a one-time pad for both the forward paths. If we now have a network with h overlapping forward and backward paths through intermediate nodes C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C h (each forward path has a node-overlap with only one backward path), secrecy rate h is again achievable against a 1-node adversary using the 2 We use the notation U N 1:
same approach (this will be a technique we will use for (m, h)bidirected CCN considered in a later section). Intuition: These simple examples give a very intuitive message: if we can use feedback (edges in backward directions, in cyclic graphs) without affecting the mincut, then this can help to achieve higher 3 secrecy rates. Essentially, we can use the feedback to create common randomness. In Section V, we show that this is indeed the case in more complex networks with multiple receivers as well, where however more elaborate schemes will be needed.
IV. DIRECTED CCN WITH 1-NODE ADVERSARY
In this section, we derive outer bounds and achievability schemes for directed CCNs where a single node is compromised and acts as a passive adversary. This is a case without feedback, which we mainly develop for comparison purposes, but we believe that these results are of independent interest. We give first an outer bound and then achievability schemes that match the outer bound in some cases.
Theorem 1: Consider a directed (m, h)-CCN with 4 m ≥ h + 1. An outer bound on the secrecy rate against a 1-node adversary is
Proof: Consider a directed (m, h)-CCN with m = h + 1. The high level idea of the proof will be to derive "top" and "lower" layer constraints for this layered network and then combine the two using Markovity relationships.
For an N -round protocol and Figure 3 illustrates the use of notation for a directed (3,2)-CCN. A directed (3, 2)-CCN illustrating notation used for proof of Theorem 1. 3 Results for unicast in [8] , [9] also show feedback leads to a relaxation in connectivity requirements for secure message transmission. 4 We consider the case of directed CCNs with m > h as in the trivial case of m = h the outer bound against a 1-node adversary is h − 1 and is achievable using secure network coding [2] .
Top layer constraints :
where (a) and (b) follow from decodability and secrecy constraints. In general, for any i ∈ {1, 2, ...h} we have the following result,
where
Lower layer constraints :
where (a) follows from secrecy constraint at node A h+1 , (b) follows from decodability constraint for the receiver not connected to node B i , (c) follows from Markov chains as shown in (5) Proof: See Appendix. For a directed (m, 2)-CCN, there exists an alternative optimal scheme (parts of which we will use in our feedback schemes in Section V). It achieves secrecy rate h−1 2 in a directed (m, h)-CCN with 1-node adversary. Described below, this scheme uses additional keys which do not reach the receivers and are cancelled at intermediate nodes 5 .
Key set cancellation (KSC) scheme: This is a 2-round scheme.
1) In the first round, the source S sends keys k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k h−1 to nodes S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S h−1 respectively and k h = − h−1 i=1 k i to S h . 2) In the second round, a secure network code [2] for 1-edge adversary is used with a slight modification (described below) using keys from the first round. This delivers h − 1 symbols to all receivers in the second round and achieves secrecy rate h−1 2 over 2 rounds. The modification mentioned in the second round is as follows. Consider a secure network code [2] for a directed (m, h)-CCN with 1-edge adversary. For this specific code, ∀j > h let X j i and h i=1 a j i X j i be the values sent on edges S i → A j and A j → B j respectively. In the second round of KSC scheme, we use this code with the modification that ∀j > h, S i sends a j i X j i +k i to A j (non-trivial coding node) instead of X j i . Node A j sums up all the values received from S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S h (shown in Figure 4 ) and sends
Hence the key set {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k h } accumulated in the first round is cancelled at all non-trivial coding nodes. The key set ensures secrecy at every non-trivial coding node and the underlying secure network code delivers h − 1 symbols to all receivers. V. UNDIRECTED AND BIDIRECTED CCN In this section, we show that use of feedback can improve secrecy rates for undirected and bidirected graphs. We prove in particular the results for undirected and bidirected CCNs that are summarized in Table I .
A. Undirected CCN
An undirected CCN allows the usage of all edges in both the directions. But it is still subject to the constraint that during each round, we can use each edge only once (in any direction that we intend to).
Theorem 2: Consider an undirected (m, h)-CCN with a 1node adversary. An outer bound for secrecy rate is h − 1. Moreover, when 6 m ≥ h + 1, there exists a scheme that achieves secrecy rate (h − 1) m−h+1 m−h+2 . 6 In the trivial case of m = h, secrecy rate h − 1 is achievable using secure network coding [2] . to S h . This constitutes key set K Ai . The uplink phase is followed by a downlink phase comprising of (m − h + 1) downlink rounds. Each round of the downlink phase is similar to the second round of KSC scheme. The key sets collected at S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S h in the uplink phase are used as part of one-time pad and cancelled at non-trivial coding nodes (before they reach the receivers) in the following manner. 1) Key set K S is cancelled at all non-trivial coding nodes in the first downlink round. 2) Key set K R is cancelled at all non-trivial coding nodes in the second downlink round. 3) For the next m − h − 1 downlink rounds, a key set from {K Ai } i =j is cancelled at non-trivial coding node A j . Each downlink round delivers h − 1 symbols to all receivers. A single round uplink phase is followed by (2 + m − h − 1) downlink rounds and hence, the secrecy rate is (h−1) m−h+1 m−h+2 .
B. Bidirected CCN
We now consider a bidirected CCN, which we create by adding for every forward edge, one parallel edge (backward edge) of the opposite directionality. Note that this does not increase the mincut to the receivers.
Lemma 2: Consider a bidirected (m, h)-CCN with a 1-node adversary. When m ≥ h + 1, there exists a scheme which achieves secrecy rate h − 1.
Proof: A single round scheme achieves secrecy rate h − 1 as follows. The receiver connected to B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B h first sends keys k R 1 , k R 2 , . . . , k R h−1 to S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S h−1 and k R h = − h−1 i=1 k R i to S h . These keys are then cancelled at non-trivial coding nodes (similar to the second round of KSC scheme) and h−1 symbols delivered to each receiver in the same round.
Up to now we have focused on a 1-node adversary. Interestingly, feedback using backward edges can help in the case of edge-adversaries as well.
Lemma 3: For bidirected (m, h)-CCN, secrecy rate h is achievable against a 1-edge adversary (taps only one directed edge).
Proof: For every pair of nodes sharing an edge, a key can be sent using the parallel backward edge. This key can be used as a one-time pad to secure the network code on the forward edge.
